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Properties of social bots
Unlike other Internet phenomena such as assistant bots, 
junk mail, Internet trolls or cyber attacks, social bots are 
characterised by the combination of three key characteris- 
tics (fig. 1):
 › Social bots are algorithms implemented in a software.
 › They pretend to be a real person.
 › Social bots try to influence people shaping an opinion.
Fig. 1 Differentiation between various Internet 
phenomena
Social bots differ from assistant bots (e.g. chatbots, digital 
virtual assistants) particularly with regard to their inten-
Summary
 › Generally, social bots are used to distort the content of 
discussions and to influence the significance of topics 
or the popularity of people and products.
 › They have the potential to change the political debate 
culture on the Internet by massively spreading (fake) 
news and to undermine faith in democracy by »poison- 
ing« a society’s climate.
 › So far, the still recent phenomenon of social bots has 
been detected particularly on the platform Twitter. 
There is only little evidence so far with regard to their 
actual impact on shaping a (political) opinion.
 › The technical possibilities to uncover the impacts of so-
cial bots lag behind their rapid development.
What is involved
Social media are enjoying increasing popularity as a source 
of information. However, messages are not only posted by 
real people. For some time already, so-called social bots 
are posting messages as well. Social bots are computer pro-
grams developed to automatically generate messages in 
social networks such as Facebook or Twitter in order to in-
fluence or manipulate discourses. They are able to generate 
meaningful texts (e.g. comments, answers or statements) 
that are similar to texts written by humans. It is rarely ob-
vious that the messages have not been created by a human, 
but by a machine.
Uncovering fake accounts of social bots, i.e. fake user pro-
files that do not belong to an authentic person, is impeded 
by the fact that these fake accounts use real user names and 
personal information (images, links) of real users. Such 
fake accounts can be easily multiplied so that thousands 
of user accounts can be created e.g. on Twitter that will ge-
nerate tens of thousands of tweets a day. It is assumed and 
partly proven that social bots are being used deliberately by 














that social bots actually succeed in influencing social 
groups. For this reason, there is little evidence showing the 
extent of their actual impact.
To date, the main fields of application for social bots are 
election campaigns, protests or attempts to influence poli-
tical tendencies (fig. 2). In this context, social bots are used 
for four purposes:
Fig. 2 Potential impact areas of social bots
 › »Muting« opposing opinions by a flood of hashtags 
with distracting, polarising or trivial messages,
 › Disseminating propaganda and spin,
 › Artificially generating high follower counts on Twit-
ter that shall emphasise the significance of the own 
position,
 › Discrediting or insulting people or tempting them to 
buy payable services on the Internet.
Social bots seem to be potentially influential in the context 
of political culmination if narrow majorities are at stake in 
political decision-making processes as it could be observed 
tion, even though they have similar technical basics. The 
purpose of assistant bots, for example, is to send automated 
messages such as weather forecasts or weather warnings.
Internet phenomena such as trolls (as human actors) as 
well as junk mail have in common with social bots that 
they intend to manipulate or make use of disinformation. 
The common feature of cyber attacks and social bots is 
their technical basis and, again, the intention to take in-
fluence.
Depending on their technical development level, social 
bots are more or less able to pretend to have a human iden-
tity. Simple social bots are able to identify keywords such as 
e.g. »refugees« and respond to these keywords by posting 
images from the Internet or retweeting comments. Some 
imitate the behaviour of human users by pretending a dif-
ferent degree of activity at different times of the day. More 
complex social bots are able to analyse communication 
contents and conduct dialogues. Currently, most of the 
social bots on the Internet are rather simple.
Only little programming skills are required to create a 
simple social bot. Manuals and instructions for this pur 
pose are freely available on the Internet. However, the level 
of difficulty increases significantly with the technical com-
plexity of the bot to be programmed, e.g. if the bot shall 
carry out language analysis and simulate dialogs.
Considerable development leaps are expected for the field 
of bot technology in the years to come. The technological 
maturity of social bots will benefit from progress made in 
the fields of artificial intelligence, machine learning and 
big data. This is why, in the future, social bots will be able 
to show even more »human-like« behaviour and will be 
more difficult to detect. The technical opportunities to de-
tect them follow this development, but – just like antivirus 
software – always lag a little bit behind.
Influence and effectiveness of social bots
There is only a limited number of notable examples show- 
ing the influence of social bots that are referred to re- 
peatedly both in the media and in scientific articles. The 
three examples most frequently mentioned in the press and 
literature are social bots that have been used during the 
protest movement in Ukraine, in the course of the Brexit 
campaign and in the US presidential election campaign 
2016.
So far, social bots have been proven primarily on the plat-
form Twitter that offers an easily accessible interface for 
programmers. There are no scientific studies yet proving 
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fluencer marketing) and of manipulating even entire mar-
kets such as stock exchange trading.
In view of IT security in the context of Industry 4.0, the In-
ternet of Things and the associated increase of networked 
devices, a risk due to social bots currently still seems to be 
unlikely, as social bots do not attack the hardware or soft-
ware of IT systems directly. Against the background of rapid 
developments and of devices becoming more and more intel-
ligent on the one hand and in view of the future capabilities 
of (social) bots on the other hand, future risks – such as e.g. 
highjacking of devices for malicious purposes – are difficult 
to assess. Social bots can represent a risk for IT security par-
ticularly if they target humans as potentially weak points of 
IT security and exploit them for attacks (e.g. by sending links 
that will install malware).
Business models of social networks are primarily based 
on sales of advertising and/or user data. These models can 
only work with humans acting on the platform and making 
purchasing decisions. In the long term, social bots represent a 
threat for the business model of social networks. Some users 
might turn away from them, because they lose confidence in 
the authenticity of the messages. Moreover, as a consequence, 
investors might withdraw from the social networks.
However, the use of social bots does not necessarily have to 
be associated with negative intentions. Possible positive ap-
plications include artistic and creative applications as well as 
approaches using social bots as a »honeypot« or as a coun-
termeasure (so-called counter-speech campaigns) in order to 
fight fake news. Moreover, they could be used for positively 
influencing human behaviour (nudging). In the latter case, 
however, this would only be ethically acceptable if the princi-
ples of informational self-determination are observed.
Options for action
The findings available so far suggest that knowledge regard- 
ing the quality and reliability of sources on the one hand 
and basic knowledge of IT-related contexts on the other 
hand are decisive for confidently dealing with propagan-
da or fake news. Children, young people and even adults 
should be encouraged and strengthened with regard to 
their media literacy in terms of so-called digital liter-
acy. A basic understanding of IT-related functionalities 
and contexts – e.g. regarding the question of how messages 
are becoming a trend – should be imperatively included 
in school education. It should be clarified whether the to-
pic of social bots can be dealt with educationally within a 
larger framework for »correctly« using networked/digital 
and social media or whether this should be addressed spe-
cifically.
in the election campaign between Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump or during the Brexit campaign. Television 
debates in election campaigns offer an opportunity to dis-
seminate opinions during or immediately after the debates.
Future impact potential and possible applica-
tions of social bots
Experts consider the potential of social bots regarding po-
litical processes to be predominantly high. Social bots can 
be used for disseminating news on the Internet in order to 
manipulate tendencies or to influence political debates and 
discourses. In particular, there is a potential danger if soci-
al bots disseminate masses of fake news in crisis situations 
such as e.g. after attacks. Thus, social bots can contribute to 
changing the political debate culture on the Internet and 
involve disinformation and a »climate poisoning« in public 
discourse.
Economic processes are another sphere of influence of so- 
cial bots. Social bots bear the risk of influencing the custo-
mer and buying behaviour of individuals (via so-called in-
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ure would ensure that only desirable algorithms would 
be granted access, while undesirable algorithms could be 
blocked. However, there is some doubt even among experts 
as of whether such a mechanism can actually be effective 
and whether it has a chance of being implemented.
Dealing with the relatively young phenomenon of social 
bots illustrates that many questions still remain unan- 
swered. However, there are only very few cases where a 
direct impact of social bots and their messages could be 
proven. Further research and investigations are required 
to enable a comprehensive clarification and evaluation of 
the risk potential as well as of the technical and legal chal-
lenges involved. Only with an enhanced knowledge base it 
is possible to answer the question whether social bots are a 
potential threat to democracy or just an annoying marginal 
phenomenon.
Another particular target group for corresponding measures 
are journalists, because as multipliers they are obliged to be 
especially diligent with regard to choosing their sources. Es-
tablished media also increasingly fall back on contents from 
social media and consider them as a basis with regard to as-
sessing the relevance of topics and news. Due to the fact that 
they can be easily manipulated, journalists should not rely 
only on the indicators commonly used in social media, such 
as e.g. the number of retweets, but carefully check these sour-
ces for credibility and authenticity – as it is done for assessing 
visual material.
The existing legal framework does not offer any justifica-
tion to prohibit social bots and their use for manipulative 
purposes. At this point in time, compulsory labelling of 
bots seems to be rather unsuitable i.a. due to difficulties 
with regard to a reliable detection of bots, a lack of sanc-
tioning possibilities as well as conflicts with data privacy. 
Instead, social media should commit themselves increas- 
ingly and implement measures against the dissemina- 
tion of social bots on their platforms. In case of unlawful 
practices committed by social bots, it should be considered 
to prosecute the initiators or programmers. Only in excep-
tional cases, it is likely to be possible to identify initiators 
of social bots who operate internationally or from third 
countries. Self-commitment of companies and civil-soci-
ety organisations would at least make it possible to put an 
end to a further dissemination of social bots.
Though it is indispensable to develop detection systems, 
no definitive technical solution has been found yet. As 
the majority of social bots uses the short message service 
Twitter, which is characterised not only by a simple con-
tent-related message structure that can be easily genera-
ted even by machines, but also by an easily controllable 
interface (application programming interface [API]), this 
interface represents a potential defence mechanism against 
social bots. For this reason, there are considerations to 
implement an identification of the accessing algorithm at 
this interface. Thus, it would be possible to determine how 
the algorithm works, what are its effects etc. Such a meas- 
